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ENDOGENOUS GROWn-I, PUBLIC
CAPITAL, AND THE CONVERGENCE OF
REGIONAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
ABSTRACT
Several explanations can be offered for the unbalanced growth of U.S. regional
manufacturing industries in the decades after World War II. The convergence hypothesis
suggests that the success of the South in catching up to the Northeast and Midwest should be
understood by analogy with the economic success of Japan and the rest of the 0-7 in closing
the gap relative to the U.S. as a whole. Endogenous growth theory, on the other hand,
assigns a central role to capital formation, broadly defined. A variant of endogenous growth
theory focuses on investments in public infrastructure as a key determinant of regional
growth. Finally, traditional location theory stresses the evolution of regional supply and
demand and the role of economies of scale and agglomeration.
This paper compares these alternative explanations of U.S. regional growth by testing
their predictions about the productive efficiency of regional manufacturing industries. We
find little evidence that technological convergence explains the regional evolution of U.S.
manufacturing industry, or that endogenous growth was an important factor. We also find
little evidence that public capital externalities played a significant role in explaining the
relative success of industries in the South and West. The main engine of differential regional
manufacturing growth over the period 1970-86 seems to be inter-regional flows of capital and
labor. The growth of multifactor productivity is essentially uniform across regions, although
there is some variation in the initial levels of efficiency.
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The American South started the post World War II era as the poorest
region of the country. Per capita disposable income was less than 70 percent
of the national level and the South produced less.than 13 percent of national
manufacturing output at that time. However, during the ensuing 40 years, the
South grew much faster than the most of the rest of the nation. As a result,
incomes in the South are now 90 percent of the national average and the South
now produces 22 percent of all manufacturing output.
Several explanations have been offered for this pattern of unbalanced
regional growth. The convergence hypothesis postulates an inverse
relationship between the rate of economic growth and the initial level of
economic activity (Barro and Sala—1—Martln 1991, Holtz—Eakin 1991).1 In this
view of growth, backwardness pj se implies a potential advantage that can
allow lagging regions to catch up to the leaders. Applied to the U.S. ,the
convergence hypothesis suggests that the success of the U.S. South in catching
up to the Northeast and Midwest should be understood by analogy with the
economic success of Japan and the rest of the G-7 in closing the gap relative
to the U.S. as a whole.
Endogenous growth theory, on the other hand, assigns a central role to
capital formation, which Is broadly defined to include physical, human.
infrastructure, and knowledge capital.2 The rate of growth of any region
depends on the rate of time preference relative to the marginal productivity
of capital, which is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale Instead of
diminishing returns as in previous neoclassical models. The larger the wedge
between the time rate of discount and the return to Investment, the more rapidthe rate of growth. When applied to U.S. regional growth, this framework
suggests that the lagging economic performance of the South was due to
inadequate capital formation, and the subsequent boom to an increase In the
rate of investment. The work of Garcia—Mila and McGulre (1987), Aschauer
(1989), Munnell (1990), and Morrison and Schwartz (1992) focuses particular
attention on the role of public investment as a determinant of U.S. regional
growth performance.
In contrast to these two explanations, traditional location theory
stresses the evolution of regional Supply and demand and the role of economies
of scale and agglomeration, combined with nation—wide factors like
technological change, aggregate savings, and population growth, as the
determinant of regional location and growth. The recent paper by Krugman
(1991) shows that the location of manufacturing activity can be concentrated
or dispersed among regions depending on the relative strengths of scale
economies, regional demand, and transport costs.
This paper compares these alternative explanations of U.S. regional
growth by testing their predictions about the productive efficiency of
regional manufacturing industries.3 Using 1970—i986 data from the Census and
Annual Survey of Manufactures for the nine Census divisions of the U.S. and
national data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic
Analysis, we estimate the level of multifactor productivity (MFP) in each
region. We then test for technological convergence and endogenous growth
effects associated with infrastructure externalities and increasing returns to
reproducible inputs, against the prediction of conventional regional theory
that the growth rates of technical efficiency are the same across regions
2(i.e., that any differences in efficiency levels are region—specific and
constant over time). This test has the collateral effect of addressing the
actively debated question of whether or not public capital has a strong impact
on manufacturing productivity.
II. Test1n the Alternative Models
Our tests of the competing theories are derived from the assumption that
there is a Hicks—neutral production function for manufacturing industry within
each region. We assume that manufactured goods in region Iinyeart,
are produced using privately owned capital Kit. labor Lit. intermediate
inputs M.t. and public Capital
i A1t
(1) = A10Bj.t e 'F [Kit. L.t, Bit].
Our specification of the public capital variable follows Meade (1952) and
Berndt and Hansson (1991) in identifying two ways that public capital
Influences output. First, it yields direct productive services and thus
appears as an argument ofF1[] (as, for example, when trucks and drivers are
combined with public highways to produce transportation services). Second,
public capital acts as an "environmental factor or 'systems spillover which
erthances the productivity of some or all of the private inputs. Thus
appears as an argument of the technical efficiency term inconstantelasticity
3form, where the parameter measures the strength of the within region
spillover effect. This formulation of (I) also assumes that the spillover
effect is separable from the pure technical effect, as represented by the
parameter A1. A10 Is the index of the level of regional productive efficiency
in the base year
A. Technological Convergence
One variant of the convergence model stresses the importance of
technological diffusion. The model of Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) assumes that
nations with low levels of technical efficiency can, at some point In their
history, become open to outside technological possibilities and can thus
appropriate the existing technologies of advanced countries at a faster rate
than the advanced nations can develop new technology. This mechanism is found
by Dowrick and Nguyen to be an important source of cross-national growth
differentials. Applied to regional growth within the U.S. ,thisvariant of
the convergence model assumes that technological backwardness is an important
source of lagging economic performance, and focuses on diffusion of technology
as a process through which regional disparities are reduced or eliminated.
The technological convergence formulation assumes that regional
technologies exhibit initial differences in the level of technical efficiency
in some base year, A10, and that the gap between the level of efficiency In
any region i and the level of technical efficiency in the most advanced
region, Aot closes with a speed of convergence 0:
4(2) in Ait -inA10 =(1(10)t)(1Aot_ in Arn).
In (2), the growth rate of Ait exceeds that of the leader, but the two
converge over time. This provides the lagging region with an extra Impetus to
output growth.
If the pattern of regional growth is influenced by (2), we should observe
that regional rates of technical change. Xi, estimated from (1) should vary
inversely across regions according to the initial level of efficiency, A10.
On the other hand, if the A1 do not vary across regions there is no
possibility of convergence and either the fl. must be zero or the initial
levels A10 must be equal.In either case, technological convergence cannot be
adduced as an explanation of regional growth differentials In U.S.
manufacturing Industry.
B.Endogenous Growth Models
The endogenous growth literature has two principal branches: the "AK'
model developed by Rebelo (1991) and the externality-increasing returns model
of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Both emphasize the importance of increasing
returns to scale generated by reproducible capital inputs and both predict
noriconvergent rates of growth. In the 'AK model, constant returns to capital
input is imposed directly and growth differentials depend on the wedge between
the marginal product of capital A1 and the rate of time discount p1. To
explain regional growth patterns, each region must be treated as a separate
economy with its own Ai and p1. Regional differences in marginal products may
5occur because of locational advantages, differences In region specific
capital, or region specific externalities generated by capital. Regional
differences In the propensity to invest that are driven by differences in the
propensity to save (p1) are more difficult to rationalize in an economy which
Is open to capital flows, but this is a problem common to many growth models,
Including Solow—type convergence models.
The Rebelo—Romer-Lucas mechanism of endogenous growth theory is based on
constant marginal returns to capital generated by capital related spillovers.
This may occur because of "within—region" externalities or, following Barro
(1990) and Barro and Sala I Martin (1992), because public capital is fixed by
policy at a constant fraction of the private capital stock, I.e., Bit =
Kit.In this last case, the Romer—Lucas production function might be written
as
a1 a1+1 .
= AIO[BitKit Lit =A10tiKitL1
If a.+ f3 equals one, private producers perceive that production takes place
under constant returns to scale and a competitive equilibrium may be
established. However, because public capital enhances production and because
it is proportional to private capital, the true elasticity of output with
respect to capital is a1+ s',,andthere are increasing returns to scale (the
further restriction a1+= Iyields the "AX" model).
The endogenous growth formulation of technology (3) is clearly a special
case of the production function (1), in which F'1(') has the Cobb-Douglas form,
disembodied technical change A is zero, and the direct and indirect effects
6of public capital are collapsed Into the parameter i. Public capital enters
the production function of manufacturing Industries mainly as a service
purchased from other sectors (e.g. ,transportationservices are reflected In
and thus the direct contribution of Bit is of minor importance.6 In
this case, tests of the parameter are equivalent to tests of the endogenous
growth model. In conjunction with tests of Increasing returns to scale.
C. Location Theory
Location theory does not have the kind of analytical unity that
characterizes the two convergence and endogenous growth hypotheses (see, for
example, Krugman 1993).It is hard to formalize a parametric test of the
theory," so we will only observe that location models typically put more
emphasis on regional or spatial factors, increasing returns to scale
(i.e., agglomeration economies), etc. There is no reliance on regional
differences in technology as an explanation of growth differentials except.
perhaps, those introduced by differences in industry mix across regions. This
leads to the expectation that the manufacturing production function for each
region should have the same degree of technical efficiency, or A =Ait
=.
= ineach year t. We can test this hypothesis using the parameters of
(1), since a common technology implies A00 =A10
=..= A.and the equality
of the technical change parameters. A1. And, as shown below, we can also test
forincreasingreturns to scale.
7III.The Sources of Growth Framework
Since our tests of the competing models primarily Involve the efficiency
term in the production function, it is unnecessary to estimate all of the
parameters of the structure of production.Instead, the relevant tests can be
based on a two stage procedure that makes use of nonparametric index number
techniques. The first step involves the computation of the Solow residual
under the assumption that public capital has no effect on private output
growth.7 The continuous time version of the Solow residual has the form:
L (4) = mjtKjt
—itL1t
—ntMit
where hats over variables denote rates of growth and the are income
shares.
In practice, the rate of productivity growth is estimated by replacing
logarithmic differentials with differences In successive logarithms and using
average shares:
(5) ln At -inAti= in —in







This approximation places only weak restrictions on the functional form of the
underlying production function (Diewert 1976) and, in particular, is not
8restricted to the Cobb-Douglas form.However, Hicks—neutral technical change
is assumed (Hulten 1973). Each term in (5), except the growth rate of the
Solow residual, can in principle be measured directly, and the growth rate of
the technology Index can thus be estimated as a residual.
Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), Denny, Fuss, and May (1981), and
Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1981) have shown that this sources of
growth model can be extended to estimate differences in the level of
productivity across regions or countries. In their framework, the difference
between the level of technology in region i at time t and region j at time s
equals the logarithmic differences in output minus the share weighted
logarithmic differences In inputs, where the shares are the simple averages of
the shares in the two regions. Thus the level Index analog to (5) is
S S




K K -1/2(it+ n) (ln K —lnK
it .js it js




(ira+ flj)(ln Hit —in
M15).
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The resulting levels indexes, Ait. are expressed relative to the efficiency of
the "base" region in the base year, A0 =1.We have used the U.S total and
1970 as the base region and year, and thus all of the productivity index
numbers should be interpreted as a proportion of national productivity in
1970.8
After calculating the regional Solow level index numbers using equation
(6), we then link measured productivity to the technical efficiency terms in
9the underlying production function (1) in the second stage of the analysis.







whereis is the elasticity of output with respect to Input X.
A comparison of the Solow residual At with the true efficiency tern
Ait reveals that public capital's contribution to output has been ignored
and that the income shares are assumed equal to the corresponding
Output elasticities c. This second assumption does not pose a problem for
income shares of the variable private factors (labor and Intermediate input)
when the economy is in competitive equilibrium and they are paid the value of
K K their marginal products. However, it Is not true that =itin general
even under competitive assumptions. The problem arises because the price of
K
capital services, P1k, can rarely be observed directly. Therefore, capital
income is usually imputed from the 'addlng—up' condition that factor payments
exhaust total income, with capital income measured as the residual. The
residual measurement of capital income therefore imposes the condition that
K L M income shares sum to one (i.e., =1— — na).Thus whenever the
K L H elasticity of scale of private inputs c1 = + isdifferent from
K
one. misstates Capital s true output elasticity.
These various sources of bias can, however, be accounted for explicitly
to yield an exact relation between the growth rate of the Solow residual and
the true efficiency term. With some manipulation, it can be shown that
10B
(8) Ait =Ait
+ + c11Bit +
—
where is the scale elasticity. This expression Indicates that the growth
rate of the measured Solow residual Is the sum of three factors: (i) the rate
of growth of public capital weighted by the indirect and direct contributions
of public capital, (ii) the growth rate of private capital weighted by a
correction for any error that is introduced by the assumption of constant
returns to scale in private inputs, and (iii) the true growth rate of
technical progress.
Equation (8) relates the growth of the Solow residual to its component
elements and forms the empirical basis for our test of the various theories of
regional growth (variants of (8) are also the basis for the marginal cost
mark—up model of Hall (1988) and the externality model of Caballero and Lyons
(1990a, 1990b). However, since the convergence hypothesis involves the level
of technical efficiency rather than its growth rate, one final step Is needed
to complete the second stage our analysis. By assuming that ,c,c1, and
A. are constant over time, we canintegrate(8) over time to obtain9
(9)ln At =inA0 +A1t'i +c]ln +
[c1
—1]ln Kit.
The various hypotheses discussed above are special cases of this equation, and




The data needed to estimate the parameters of equation (9) are described
in full in our earlier papers (Hulten and Schwab 1984, 1991). Our analysis is
restricted to manufacturing industries. Most of our regional data were
obtained from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures
and then reconciled to Bureau of Labor Statistics totals. We use gross Output
as our measure of output In this paper, and thus our private inputs include
capital, labor, and intermediate inputs (corrected for the purchased services
problem). Since regional output deflators are not available from any source,
we have used the national deflators from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This introduces a potential bias in our results, since any error in the price
deflator translates directly into an error in measuring real output and thus
into an error in measuring the left hand side of (9)•hl
Our data on public capital are the same as those used in Munnell (1990);
a full description of the data are included in Appendix A of that paper.
Briefly, Munnell used annual data on state capital outlays to allocate BEA
estimatesof the national stock of public capital among the states. Her data
set includes estimates of total public capital for each state as well as
separate estimates of state stocks of highways and water and sewer facilities.
Since the Munnell data are available only for the period 1970-1986, our
analysis is limited to those years.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on our measures of manufacturing
input, output, and the Solos., residual. Table I also includes summary
statistics on regional Output per worker, capital per worker, and public
12capital.It Is clear from this table that the manufacturing sector grew much
faster In the South and West .Grossoutput rose 3.75 percent per year in the
Sun Belt during the 1970—1986 period as compared to only 1.53 percent per year
in the Snow Belt.12 Labor input grew by more than 1 percent per year in the
Sun Belt but fell in the Snow Belt. Public capital grew more rapidly in the
Sun Belt (2.09 versus 1.30 percent).
It is highly significant for our subsequent analysis that the
differential grow rates of regional output were due almost entirely to the
differential growth in inputs. Regional differences in the growth rates of
the Solow residual (MFP) were relatively small, with the Snow Belt actually
enjoying a slight advantage over the Sun Belt (1.41 percent per year versus
1.23).It was also the case that the level of MFP in the various regions of
the country were very similar at the beginning and end of our sample period.
It is also clear that the growth rates of capital per worker and output per
worker were roughly the same in the Sun Belt and Snow Belt regions over this
period. Our conclusions about MFP convergence during the years 1970—1986 can
thus be extended to the convergence in output per worker due to
capital-deepening. Our data would thus suggest a theory of regional economic
growth that stressed the cross-sectional equality of productivity, prior to
any econometric analysis.
This impression is reinforced by decomposing the total variation of MFP
into variation across time within in regions and variation across regions.
Slightly less than one—half of the the variation in the level of MFP is due to
cross sectional variation, with the balance due to variation over time. For
the growth rates of MFP, however, virtually all of the variation is variation
13over time, I.e. there is almost no variation in the growth rate of MFP across
regions. Given the substantial differences In the growth rates of public
capital stock in different regions, the lack of variation In the growth rate
of Mfl' suggests that the two variables are essentially uncorrelated.
Table 1 covers a fairly short period 1970—1986, and it is possible that
convergence (in terms of MFP or capital per worker) was essentially complete
by that time. Regional gross output data are not available prior to the
mid-1960s, but regional value added data are available beginning in 1951. In
Table 2. we briefly shift the focus to value added as a measure of output in
order to extend the analysis back in time. That table indicates that there
has been no significant compression (or divergence) in MF'P, in output per
worker, or in capital—deepening since 1951.
V. Econometric Results I: Hypothesis Tests of Competing Models
While the data shown in Tables I and 2 are suggestive, they do not
constitute a formal test of the alternative hypotheses about regional growth.
An econometric test can, however, be obtained by estimating the parameters of
the system of nine linear eqi.ations, each relating the natural logarithms of
the level of regional Mn' to a constant, the natural log of private capital in
the region, the natural log of public capital and time.In other words, we
implement the model (9) without any parameter restrictions across equations
Moreover, since we use index number procedures to account direct inputs of
capital and labor, we impose no restrictions on the form of F'('). Our paper
14thus differs from much of the other econometric literature on regional growth,
in which parameters are constrained to be equal across regions, except
possibly for regional fixed effects.Indeed, one of our objectives Is
the validity of the cross—regional parameter restrictions which we have
to be tests of the alternative theories of growth discussed above.
The nesting scheme of the various cross—equation restrictions Is shown in
regional technical change exhibits neither convergence nor divergence. R3 and
test whether the MFP elasticity of public capital and the scale elasticity
of private Inputs are zero in all regions, and thus test for endogenous growth
effects associated with public and private capital, respectively (I.e. ,test
for the importance of public capital externalities and increasing returns to
scale in private inputs).
The boxes on the third level test whether the restrictions on the second
level can be Imposed jointly, two at a time. There are six possibilities for
these pair wise restrictions: R12, the initial levels of MFP are equal (R1)
and the growth rates of technical change are also equal (R2). letting the
to test
shown
Figure 1.The box at the top level represents
(9) is estimated without any parameter restrict
boxes on the next line represent, respectively,
each of four sets of parameters (designated R1,
equality across regions of the intercept of the
other parameters to vary, and thereby tests for
among the regions. Similarly, the restrictions
the regional growth rates of technical change
this restriction cannot be rejected, we cannot
the case in which the system
ions (designated R0). The four
the equality restrictions on
R2, R3, R4). R1 tests for the
MFP regressions allowing all
equality of initial MFP levels
in R2 test for the equality of
the coefficients on t).If



























































































































































 other parameters vary freely across regions; R13. the initial levels of MFP
are equal (R1) and the elasticity of MFP with respect to public capital are
also equal (R3); and so on for R14r R23, R24, and R34. Only the boxes for
R12 and R34 are shown in Figure 1, for ease of exposition, but these are also
the joint hypotheses of particular interest, since the restrictions of R12
imply identical regional paths for technical change and R34 imply that there
are no endogenous growth effects linked to public or private capital.
The four boxes on the fourth line of Figure 1 show the possible
combinations In which three of the four restrictions hold jointly (they are
designated R123, R134, R124, and R234). Finally, R1234 on the bottom level Is
a test of all the restrictions sinultaneously.If all of the restrictions
hold jointly, the regional paths of MFP are identical and are not influenced
by the amount of public capital in each region, nor by increasing returns to
scale effects. This situation Is, of course, very unfavorable to the
convergence and endogenous growth explanations of the evolution of regional
manufacturing industry in the U.S.
Table 3 presents the sum of squared errors and F statistics associated
with the various possible restrictions. It is apparent from this table that
the data do not reject (at the 1 or 5 percent levels of significance) any of
the restrictions imposed by themselves.If, for example, the public capital
parameter, ,isconstrained to be zero In each region, the resulting model,
(9') in A =InA.+At +[c.-1]ln K.
it iD 1 i it
cannotbe distinguished from the original (9).Similarly,Table 3indicates
17that. rnutatis mutandi, a model that makes A10 or A the same across regions,
or makes (c1 —1)zero, cannot be distinguished from (9).Further, the data
do not reject any of the pairs of restrictions imposed jointly. It Is Only
when the fourth level of three—way restrictions is reached that one set of
restrictions, R134, Is rejected; the data do not accept the simultaneous
equality of the initial levels of HFP, a zero elasticity of MFP with respect
to public capital, and constant returns to the private inputs, implying that
the model ln At =inA0 +AtIs not a valid model. However, all of the
other three-way restriction do hold jointly. Finally, the simultaneous
imposition of all restrictions simultaneously, R1234. is also rejected, so
that in At =lnA0 +Atis not an appropriate model.13
Table 3 thus provides very little good news for the convergence or
endogenous growth explanations of regional manufacturing growth. The
predictions of these models simply do not dominate other explanations In which
convergence and endogenous growth play no role.
VI. Econometric Results II: Estimation of Restricted Models
The results presented in Table 3 are compared with a base-line assumption
that all parameters, including the elasticities of MFP with respect to public
and private capital, vary across regions.In this section we approach the
problem from a slightly different point of view by restricting the
elasticities of public and private capital to be equal across regions. This
18is consistent with the recent literature on regional growth (e.g. ,Holtz—Eakiri
1992, Garcia-Mila, McGulre, and Porter 1993, Munnell1990,and Aschauer 1990)
This shift in perspective make it easier to compare our results to other
recent research. Moreover, because there are so many parameters in the
unrestricted version of the models in the previous section, it is hard to
estimate any particular parameter precisely and to interpret the resulting
coefficients. Finally, restricting the elasticities to be eq.1al across
regions is consistent with the data. As shown in Table 3, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that all of the elasticities with respect to public and private
capital are equal to zero, and thus we certainly cannot reject the hypothesis
that they are all equal to one another.
The results of this alternative approach are shown in Table 4.The first
column of Table 4 reports the results obtained from the estimation of the most
constrained version of these models where the initial level of MFP and the
growth rate of MFP are all assuined to be eqiial across regions. Interestingly,
the results are similar to those found in the earlier literature on public
capital: the coefficient on public capital Is statistically significant and
reasonably large given that the direct effect of public capital is already
accounted for in the purchased service component of F1('). The private
capital coefficient suggests that there are mildly decreasing returns to scale
and the point estimate of the time parameter implies a rate of MFP growth of
0.8 percent per year.
It is common in this literature to include a measure of capacity
utilization in order to control for the cyclical effect of demand fluctuations
on the Solow residual. Many, however, view this practice with some
19skepticism, As Berndt and Fuss (1986) and Hulten (1986) show, there Is rio
theoreticalJustification for Including capacity utilization in a productivity
model since the effects of the business cycle should be reflected in the
output elasticity of private capital. Capacity utilization is particularly
problematical in regional studies since regional capacity utilization measures
are not available.
Setting these concerns aside for the moment, column (5) in Table 4 adds
the Federal Reserve Board's national capacity utilization data for
manufacturin.g to the model in column (1). As shown In column (5), when we add
capacity utilization the picture does not change very much, though the error
sum of squares does fall significantly.
Regional fixed effects are introduced In column (2) by allowing for
separate regional intercepts (New England is taken as the base region). As in
previous studies, the addition of these regional fixed effects causes the
public capital variable to become statistically insignificant (and negative as
well). The same is true for private capital, implying constant returns to
scale. Five of the regional intercepts are significant at conventional
levels, and the rest are marginally significant at low levels. Adding
capacity utilization does not change this picture, except to reduce the sum of
squared errors and Improve the significance of the regional intercepts.
Column (3) allows for regional time effects while holding the intercepts
the same for all regions (I.e., we impose a common level of MFP at the outset
to see if the times paths of HFP diverge). We find that this yields a larger
estimate of the public capital coefficient than the base case of column (1),
and that it implies strongly decreasing returns to scale. Half of the
20regional time effects are significant. As before, adding capacity utilization
does not change the results,
The last step taken In Table 4 Is to go beyond the fixed effects model
and allow both the Intercepts and time coefficients to vary across regions.
The results, shown in column (4), are consistent with the fixed effects model
of column (2): the public and private capital variables are insignificant,
half of the intercept dummy variables are significant, and none of the
regional time dummies are significant. However, the addition of the capacity
utilization variable does make a difference. When It is included, the public
capital coefficient is significantly negative, Implying that public capital
externalities reduce KFP with an elasticity of —.24. This is a highly
implausible result, and it casts doubt on the usefulness of using an aggregate
capacity utilization adjustment.
How do the results of Table 4 accord with the hypothesis tests of the
preceding table? The constraints imposed in Table 4 on the public and private
capital parameters only restrict them to be equal, and not to be equal to zero
as in Table 3.Moreover, Table 3 considers a wider range of parameter
restrictions (i.e.. on the time variable). However, with these differences in
mind, it is clear that the proceeding up the hypothesis tree In Figure 1 using
Table 4 F—statistics produces similar conclusions about the models that the
data wants to reject (i.e., some difference in initial levels, no difference
in the growth rates of MFP, and no effect of public capital).
We note, finally, that we tested several variants of the our models.
Following Fernald (1992), we carried out an analysis of (9) using deviations
from time trend rather than the log—level of variables in order to control for
21demand fluctuations and to reduce any simultaneous equation bias resulting
from the endogenelty of K and B. The results of this exercise were similar to
the results obtained using the capacity utilization variable.
We also tested the assumption of perfect Competition using a Hall (1988)
marginal cost mark—up model.In an imperfectly competitive market where the
ratio of price to marginal cost is a constant .theincome shares of labor
and intermediate input are equal to the true output elasticities divided by i
L L M H
(i.e., /iand =/ii).Ifcapital s share is calculated as
a residual so the shares sum to 1, then it is not difficult to show that
Hall's model implies that (9) ecomes
(9") lri At in A.0 +)t++ c]ln B.t +[ci
—11in K.t
+(i — 1)[1t1n (M.t / K.) + (Lit /
We estimate this model by including the share weighted log of the intermediate
Input—capital and the labor—capital ratios to the models shown in Table 4. As
shown in equation (9"), the coefficient on this variable represents an
estimate of (.t— 1).Under perfect competition price equals marginal cost, p
eqials 1, and the coefficient on 1Tln (Hit / Kit)I (Lit / Kit) will
equal zero; if firas have market power then price will exceed marginal cost
and this coefficient will be positive.
Estimates of different versions of this Hall model are shown in Table 5.
In those specifications where we include capacity utilization variable, our
estimate of (i— 1)is always positive and significant; in those
specifications where we exclude capacity utilization variable, our estimate of
22(.z —1)Is always Insignificant. Estimates of all of the other parameters In
Table S are quite similar to the corresponding estimates in Table 4.
VII. Conclusions
This paper has proposed a framework for testing three of the leading
explanations of comparative regional growth based on different predictions
about the times paths of technical efficiency. While the tests are limited
to the manufacturing industry and not all of the variants of the competing
theories are tested, the tests do provide evidence against two of the major
competitors. Specifically, the absence of MFP convergence or divergence is
not compatible with the predictions of the technological convergence or
endogenous growth models. Moreover, an inspection of the trends in Output per
workerand capital per worker for the 1970-86 and the 1951-86 periods using
different output concepts does not offer any encouragement forthe
capital—deepening variant of the convergence hypothesis.
We have also found that the externalities associated with public capital
are, for the most part, not statistically significant and the point estimates
of the elasticity of KFP with respect to public capital in some versions of
the model are negative. Of course, this applies only to manufacturing, but it
lends little support to the argument that public capital externalities are an
important engine of growth.If externalities are not significant in this
important sector, where do they play an important role inregionaleconomic
development?
23We also find that manufacturing is subject to constant returns to scale
at the regional level. This result suggests that agglomeration economies may
play only a limited role in regional economic growth.
Our findings suggest that manufacturing industry was open to flows of
capital, labor, and technology, and this is more congenial to the traditional
equilibrium approach to location theory than to the other two models which are
imported from international growth analysis. The main engine of differential
regional manufacturing growth over the period 1970-86 seems to be
inter—regional flows of capital and labor, while the growth of multifactor
productivity Is essentially uniform across regions (although there appears to
be some variation In the initial levels of efficiency).
Several aspects of our results deserve emphasis in this summing up.
First, the statistical results reported above refer to a relatively short, and
recent, time period: 1970—86.It may well be the case that technological
convergence and public capital externalities were important in an earlier
stage of U.S. regional development. However, our estimates of a limited
version of our model for the period 1951—86 (which by necessity could not
consider public capital and relied on value added rather than gross output)
yielded virtually the same results. Second. it cannot be emphasized too
strongly that we have assumed that the Law of One Price holds.If there is
significant regional variation in the deflators used to estimate real output,
our results could be dramatically altered.
Third, our finding that public capital externalities were not an
important source of regional manufacturing growth does not mean that public
capital formation is irrelevant.It may well have played an essential role In
24facilitating the movement of capital, labor, and intermediate inputswhichwe
find are the main sources of differential regional growth. Furthermore,
because the impact of lumpy infrastructure projects like the Interstate
Highway System may be highly non-linear, there may be extended periods during
which the average product of public capital Is high but Its marginal product
Is almost zero. But, even with these caveats, our results are relevant for
the question of whether undetected externalities might thus have led
governments to supply too little public capital In recent years. We find no
evidence of under-supply in the regional manufacturing data.
25Notes
1As noted by Baumol (1986), the convergence hypothesis has a long tradition
and an extensive literature. Recent contributions include Dollar and Wolff
(1988), De Long (1988), Bauinol et. al. (1989), Barro (1991), and ?lankiw, Romer
and Well (1990).
2
The endogenous growth model was developed by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988),
and Rebelo (1991). The survey by Sala-i—Martin (1990a, 1990b) provides an
extensive description of the main variants of the endogenous growth model and
their relation to optimal growth theory.
Ourfocuson regional manufactur1n industry Is motivated in part by the
importance on manufacturing in the regional model developed by Krugman (1991).
and also by the fact that data on inputs and output are better for this sector
of the economy. However, the narrower industrial focus of this paper means
that our results are not strictly comparable to those based on broader
measures of regional output such as total private gross state product.
This specification of the public capital externality assumes that the only
source of spillovers in each region is the quantity of public capital within
that region. This reflects the assumption that the highway system of one
region gives rise to positive spillovers, but the highways of an adjacent
region have no effect at all. This is consistent with our interpretation of
the region specific externalities as an engine of regionally endogenous
growth. However, It is also possible that public capital externalities
affect all regions, in which case the relevant argument of A[1 would be
total public capital, Bt = or a vector of the public capital in all
regions.
26It should be notedthatthe literature on convergence theory has two
distinct branches: the one described above and another in which convergence
takes place as a country or region moves to Its steady—state rate of growth by
capital deepening. When the production function has the form =kt.the
convergence equation is given by an equation similar to (2):
(2') in -inq =(1(1)t)(1 -in
q0),
where '= (1-a)iis the speed of convergence parameter (Holtz-Eakln (1991),
following Mankiw, Romer, and Well (1990)). With labor— augmenting technical
progress at a rate A, the steady state values of output and capital per "raw"
worker will grow at the rate of technical change, and the speed of convergence
parameter becomes i(1—a)(T1+A). This is the approach taken by Barro and
Sala—l-Martin (1991) and Holtz—Eakin (1991), and both studies find a
convergence effect within the regions of the U.S. In this Interpretation, the
older industrial regions of the U.S. experienced slower growth than the South
and West because the older regions were further along in the convergence
process and closer to their balanced growth paths. This interpretation has
been challenged by Blanchard (1991), who demonstrates that the convergence
equation (2' ) can be derived from the spatial equilibrium model and shows that
the convergence parameter of their estimating equation can equally be
Interpreted as a demand elasticity. We will not attempt an econometric test
of (2' ) in this paper, but will comment on Its applicability In our section on
regional data.
6
According to BLS data, trucks and autos accounted for approximately 8
percent of the income accruing to equipment in manufacturing, and thus about
one percent of the total income, over the period 1949—83, and that
communications and electricity generation equipment, which account for about 9
percent of income accruing to equipment, and, again, about one percent of
total income. This low share reflects the fact that public capital Is mainly
an input to the transportation and communication sectors, to public utilities,
and to some service industries, and these sectors pass along their services
(and thus the services of public capital) by selling their output to
manufacturing industries. Thus, public capital is at best a marginal
contributor to the gross Output of many industries.
27This mode of analysis, also termed sources of growth analysis." was
developed by Solow (1957), Kendrick (1961), Denlson (1962). and Jorgenson and
Grlliches (1967). It is the conceptual basis of the recent studies by the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983) and Jorgenson, Gollop,andFrauineril
(1987), and is the framework used in our 1984 and 1991 studies of regional
economic growth, The sources of growth analysis has, for the most part.
Ignored the role of public capital as a source of output growth.
8All growth rates are the continuous growth rates of the level Solow index
numbers.
The constancy of these parameters imposes restrictions on the underlying
technical efficiency function in (1):if, for example, the elasticity of
scale is constant at c, the production function is homogeneous of degree c.
Note, however, that the multiplicative restrictions on the form of the
efficiency function does not Impose restrictions on the rest of the
technology, F('). In particular, they do not imply that the production
function has the Cobb—Douglas form.
10
An econometric problem that arises when estimating (9) using ordinary least
squares should be noted. Private capital (and possibly public capital as
well), are endogenously determined and thus may be correlated with the error
term in the regression. Instrumental variables might be used to avoid
simultaneous equations bias, but a set of valid regional instruments is hard
to find.
If the Law of One Price does not hold for manufactured goods within the
U.S. market and there is in fact regional variation in output prices, our
assumption of one price will overstate real output in those regions where
prices are higher than average. This, in turn, overstates the level index of
the Solow residual.If, in addition, the regional output prices are changing
relative to the average, a bias is introduced into the growth rate of the
Solow residual as well.
12Throughout the paper, we define the Snow Belt as the New England, Middle
Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central Census divisions. The
Sun Belt includes the South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central,
Mountain, and Pacific divisions.
2813i a 5 percent level of significance is used In the tests of first level of
hypotheses (R1, R2, etc.) then a different level of significance should be
used in tests of the Joint hypotheses. An approximate significance on 20
percent would, for example, be assigned to R1234, by the Bonferroni
inequality (See Savln 1984).
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32</ref_section>Tsbte 1 
Srmsry of  the Lewel  sr  Growth  Rste  of  Mars.ifecturlng Gross 0tpt 
1970-1986 
(U.S.  1970  1.000) 
ME  EMC  IMC  SA  ESC  USC  N  PC  Total.  lelt  I,(t 
Gross  0tput 
1970  0.0590  0.1979  0.2767  0.0764  0.1234  0.0573  0.0780  0.0220  0.1094  1.0000  0.6100  0.3900 
1986  0.0851  0.2106  0.3623  0.1212  0.2201  0.0978  0.1564  0.0428  0.1935  1.4697  0.7792  0.7105 
Growth  RIte  0.0229  0.0039  0.0169  0.0289  0.0362  0.0334  0.0435  0.0416  0.0357  0.0249  0.0153  0.0373 
LabOr 
1970  0.0773  0.2205  0.2620  0.0633  0.1325  0.0579  0.0618  0.0181  0.1053  1.0000  0.6227  0.3767 
1986  0.0733  0.1626  0.2196  0.0684  0.1531  0.0628  0.0765  0.0310  0.1333  0.9668  0.5254  0.4611 
Growth  Rate  -0.0017  -0.0190  -0.0110  0.0049  0.0099  0.0050  0.0134  0.0314  0.0156  0.0008  -0.0106  0.0126 
Private CapitaL 
1970  0.0580  0.1890  0.2877  0.0552  0.1261  0.0591  0.0896  0.0199  0.1136  1.0000  0.5894  0.4106 
1966  0.0902  0.2210  0.3456  0.1004  0.2122  0.0921  0.1727  0.0458  0.1995  1.4812  0.7371  0.7240 
Growth Rat.  00273  0.0098  0.0115  0.0374  0.0325  0.0271  00409  0.0521  00352  0.0246  0.0157  0.0354 
intermediate  Input 
1970  0.0506  0.1638  0.2712  0.0859  0.1258  0.0576  0.0873  0.0245  0.1069  1.0000  0.5976  0.4024 
1986  0.0640  0.1757  0.3428  0.1204  0.2003  0.0945  0.1677  0.0371  0.1722  1.3749  0.7030  0.6719 
Growth  Rate  0.0147  -0.0028  0.0133  0.0211  0.0291  0.0308  00407  0.0259  0.0296  0.0199  0.0102  0.0320 
Multifactor  Productivity 
1970  0.9113  0.9771  1.0192  1.1095  0.9576  0.9839  1.0226  1.0504  1.0202  1.0000  1.0027  0.9945 
1986  L1639  1.1966  1.2869  1.3137  1.2122  1.2255  1.2531  1.2069  1.2285  1.2386  1.2505  1.2251 
Growth  Ret.  0.0153  0.0128  0.0146  0.0106  0.0147  0.0139  0.0127  0.0087  0.0116  00134  0.0138  0.0130 
Labor  Productivity 
1970  0.7630  0.8976  1.0561  1.2075  0.9315  0.9896  1.2630  1.1726  1.0383  1.0000  0.9795  1.0353 
1986  1.1303  1.2948  1.6481  1.7721  1.4192  I .551?  2.0444  1.3815  1.4304  1.5096  1.4831  1.5.409 
Growth  Rete  0.0246  0.0229  0.0278  0.0240  0.0263  0.0283  0.0301  0.0102  0.0200  0.0257  0.0259  0.0249 
Cepitet  labor Ratio 
1970  0.7310  0.8570  1.0961  0.8724  0.9522  1.0307  1.4541  1.0622  1.0780  1.0000  0.9464  1.0899 
1986  1.1984  1.3592  1.5719  1.4613  1.3687  1.4669  2.2570  1.4790  1.4745  1.5010  1.4411  1.5701 
Growth  Rate  00292  0.0285  0.0224  0.0325  0.0221  0.0221  0.0273  0.0201  0.0196  0.0254  0.0263  0.0228 
Public  Capital 
1970  0.0516  0.1820  0.1893  0.0847  0.1235  0.0620  0.0920  00497  0.1652  1.0000  05076  0.4924 
1966  0.0645  0.2268  0.2219  0.1119  0.1949  0.0793  0.1364  0.0816  01959  1.3132  0.6251  0.6881 
Growth  Rate  0.0139  00138  0.0099  0.0174  0.0285  0.0154  0.0247  0.0310  0.0106  0.0170  0.0150  0.0209 
lit  Mew  Er,lsrs,  MA  • MlôL. At(.ntic,  EPIC  —  East  North Central. WWC •  lest  Plorth  Centrsl SA  • South Atlantic, £SC  • East  South  Central, USC • Uest 
South  Central, H  =  MotJ-ta$n,  PAC  Pacific Table 2 
Sucriary of  the  Growth  Rate of Manufacturing  Value  Added 
¶ 951  -  1966 
NE  NA  tic  i.c  SA  ESC  USC  N  PAt  Total  Salt  Belt 
Value Added 
0.0258  0.0164  0.0215  0.0338  0.0451  0.0445  0.04Th  0.0570  0.0445  0.0308  0.0222  0.0459 
Labor 
0.0002  -0.0076  -0.0026  0.0111  0.0190  0.0193  0.0238  0.0368  0.0230  0.0065  -0.0025  0.0219 
Private  Capital 
0.0272  0.0183  0.0207  0.0370  0.0404  0.0428  0.0474  0.0526  0.0443  0.0309  0.0223  0.0442 
Multifactor  Productivity 
0.0182  0.0166  001Th  0.0191  0.0192  0.01fl  0.0160  0.0533  0.0155  0.0111  0.0176  0.0170 
Labor  Productivity 
0.0256  0.0238  0.0261  0.0277  0.0261  0.0252  0.0235  0.0202  0.0216  0.0244  0.0246  0.0240 
Capital  Labor  Ratio 
0.0270  0.0257  0.0233  0.0259  0.0213  0.0235  0.0236  0.0158  0.0214  0.0245  0.0248  0.0223 
WE a Mew  England,  MA • Middle  Atlantic, (NC a East  Worth  Central,  WNC • Jest  Worth  Central,  SA a South Atlantic,  ESC a East  South  Centrals  USC • West 
South  Central,  N a Motmtain,  PAC  a Pacific TabLe 3
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2  .4496  .7941  6954  .8106  .5108  .8691  .7732  .8922 
SSE  .46436  .17369  .25696  .15982  .41275  .10994  .19139  .09096 
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